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WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DATE 2007

DISPATCH NO. SGAA 3146
74-126-40

DATE: 19 FEB 1958

INFO: Chief, SE

TO : Chief, SE

FROM : []

19 FEB 1958

SUBJECT: General-- [REDACTED] REDWOOD/Psych/AECROAK/AERODYNAMIC/AEPPARADE

Specific Information requested by Headquarters

REFERENCE: SGAW-17674, 16 December 1957

Removed from Project Aerodynamic
CS Classification: 74-124-29/3
JUB # 69-425/83
Box: 21, Fold: 11

ACTION REQUESTED: See paragraph 1-d, 2-d.

The following is the information requested by you in the reference memorandum:

1. Re paragraph 2, ref.

a. The total scheduled and random AERODYNAMIC transmitter hours have been increased during the past three months from 16 in September to $41\frac{1}{2}$ in December. This represents a very substantial increase over the transmitter time authorized by the AERODYNAMIC Communications Annex, dated 3 November 1953, which authorizes three 15-minute broadcasts per week on one transmitter or a total of approximately three transmitter hours per month.

b. The time authorized by Communications Annexes represents the minimum transmitter time to be allotted to each respective show. The total amount of transmitter time actually available at PYREX for these radio shows is considerably more than the total time required by all Communications Annexes put together; it varies sometimes to a large degree from day-to-day, depending on the workload provided by activities other than radio broadcasts. The allocation of this extra transmitter time among the various radio shows (nine in all) is done by WEMCA jointly with the respective case officer, on the basis of time provided by the appropriate Communications Annex. Consequently, with AECROAK Communications Annex still non-existent and the AERODYNAMIC and AEPPARADE Annexes each calling for only three transmitter hours a month, the position of the SR/PP field case officer when negotiating additional transmitter time with WEMCA has been weak indeed. The fact that AECROAK has been given so much transmitter time (760 hours average p/m) must be attributed to the effect of Headquarters post-Hungarian Revolution policy calling for greater emphasis on Russian language propaganda directed to Great-Russian elements in the USSR and the co-operation of WEMCA.

c. In fulfillment of Headquarters request stated in DIR-04587, dated 23 January 1958, WEMCA has added a total of one hour fixed schedule transmitter time daily on two transmitters and two frequencies between 1830Z and 1900Z. This was the only open transmitter time available during the so-called "desirable audience time". It will raise the monthly total of AERODYNAMIC transmitter hours to 75.

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SECRET

74-124-29/3

74-124-29/3

SECRET

SGAM
Page 2

5401 31481
19 FEB 1958

d. At the present time the only available transmitter time at PYREX is the "undesirable audience time", i.e. between the hours of 2300Z and 0030Z, and 0300Z. Thus, if still more transmitter time is requested by Headquarters for AERODYNAMIC show, it will be necessary to take some time away from one of the other SR shows in order to give it to AERODYNAMIC. Increasing broadcasting time of one project at the expense of another is a matter of policy and is out of bounds of field case officer's jurisdiction; therefore, any further increase in AERODYNAMIC transmitter time will require specific instructions from Headquarters.

2. Re paragraph 3, ref.

a. Jamming of PYREX broadcasts heard by the local Monitoring Unit has been a subject of study by WEMCA for some time. Checking of frequencies used by the jammers helped to establish the fact that jamming heard locally is skywave jamming and that it could not be effective in the target areas. Hence, it was assumed that the main purpose of this skywave jamming was to create confusion and force us into using drastic measures such as constant changing of frequencies during a broadcast, making it extremely difficult for a potential listener to find and/or follow our broadcasts. We had indeed obliged the Soviets by using these evasion tactics, until last December it was decided to quit using it. This decision was based mainly on two factors:

1) It was assumed on the strength of certain facts of technical nature as well as information concerning cost and general complexity of jamming operations that the Soviets at the present time do not possess a foolproof jamming system; although, technically it is possible to develop such a system. Consequently, it was assumed that while jamming may be quite effective in some large centers, there are many large areas in the USSR where jamming is much less effective or ineffective. The most recent estimate of the cost of Soviet jamming system in the USSR given in Bimonthly Jamming Report, dated 6 December 1957, which is part of KUBARK EMW Brief, is as follows:

Investment in Transmitters (1600), Buildings, Antennas and Auxilliary Equipment	\$180 million
Annual operation cost	~ 75 million

In addition the Soviets could not possibly use all the power needed to completely jam all anti-Communist broadcasts as it would cause interference with their own broadcasts at home.

2) Information found in periodic reports of an agent in Bucharest who has been monitoring SHELLAC broadcasts beamed to that area. This monitoring operation has been run jointly by WEMCA and SHELLAC case officer for approximately three months. The agent has been given schedules of both fixed time and random time SHELLAC broadcasts and the identifying data of the skywave jammers heard in Athens. The results so far have been as follows:

SECRET

SECRET

SGAA

Page 3

~~51701~~ 31401

19 FEB 1958

a) The agent did not hear the skywave jammers heard in Athens. He heard groundwave jammers. The effectiveness of these jammers varied, depending on the atmospheric conditions, often making them quite effective in the central area of Bucharest. Their effectiveness, however, diminished in the outlying areas of the city, and was weak or nil in a large area out in the country where the broadcasts were heard.

b) He thought that random time broadcasts were preferable to fixed scheduled time broadcasts because the Communist's jammers were always waiting for the latter, ready to pounce on them with the opening sound, while jamming of the former proved less consistent and less effective

c) He thought that use of evasion tactics makes listening to a broadcast extremely difficult and must have a discouraging effect on potential listeners.

b. The fact that Bucharest is the primary target of anti-Communist broadcasts beamed into Rumania, makes the task of developing effective jamming a much easier one for the Rumanian government. In the European USSR, for example, with its huge territory and multiple densely populated areas, the problem of maintaining an effective jamming system must be infinitely more difficult and costly.

c. Encouraged by the results of the SHELLAC monitoring operation which produced a great deal of desired information, WEMCA has submitted a memorandum to Chief, SR [] requesting that if possible, similar monitoring operations be inaugurated in the USSR using KUBARK personnel in order to "obtain information that is necessary to get a true picture regarding the degree of effectiveness of the present broadcasts beamed into the USSR, and that may be used to increase their effectiveness in the future".

d. We strongly recommend that this request be given a serious consideration by SR/PP, Washington. The weakest point of our radio activities has been almost complete lack of information regarding the degree of audibility and intelligibility of our broadcasts in the target areas. This uncertainty regarding the degree of penetration of Soviet jamming by our broadcasts has been responsible to a large degree for lack of enthusiasm toward our radio propaganda activities among Headquarters personnel. Consequently, radio propaganda has been demoted to the level of "marginal activities", with only a half-hearted effort being made to keep it going.

e. This situation undoubtedly pleases the Soviets to no end, as the determination and the fury with which they have been jamming our broadcasts in order to prevent them from being heard by the Soviet people proves quite conclusively that they have great fear for the effect these broadcasts may have on their people and their own fate if heard regularly. Rather than giving up, would it not be logical then, to become even more determined and more furious than the Soviets in trying to beat the Soviets in their effort to stay ahead of us in this game just as we are determined in beating the Soviets in the game of control of outer space since they launched their Sputniks.

SECRET

SECRET

SGAA
Page 4

~~31401~~ 31401

19 FEB 1958

f. Monitoring of AECROAK broadcasts as a means of evaluating the effectiveness of Soviet jamming in target areas and the technical qualities of the broadcasts had been suggested in the past by [redacted] but to no avail. We hope that success of SHELLAC monitoring operations in providing valuable information will help to stimulate new interest in Headquarters towards monitoring on our radio broadcasts in the USSR.

g. We suggest that periodic monitoring operations be considered in such areas as Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, the Caucasus, or any other areas where U. S. Embassy personnel are allowed to travel. We also suggest that, if possible, Soviet radio receivers be used in the operations. WEMCA is ready to furnish necessary broadcasting schedules, suggesting at the same time that all monitoring details be worked out at the staff level.

3. Re paragraph 5, ref.

We shall send each month, beginning February, a complete set of scripts produced in the field together with the regular monthly progress report.

4. Re paragraph 6, ref.

So far we have not been able to do much in regard to investigating the local Russian Orthodox Church situation. Therefore, we have nothing to report on the subject at this time.

5. Re paragraph 7, ref.

The whole matter of Greek broadcasts to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain in their respecting languages is at present in a state of flux. It seems that the responsibility for running these broadcasts is being transferred from one ministry to another and, it will be two or three months before this matter is settled. In the meantime, a project has been approved, which provides for financial support of this activity by KUBARK. We have been told that the Greek authorities are ready to resume broadcasts to Bulgaria and Albania with which Greece has no diplomatic relations. However, it is anticipated that we will run into difficulty when trying to get the Russian language show on the air, as the Greeks feel that this may anger the local Soviet Ambassador. At any rate, if the Russian language broadcasts are approved, they will have to be superficially of the most inoffensive nature--nothing openly anti-Soviet, mostly straight news. We are expected to furnish the programs. This will still allow us to give the Soviet listeners a considerable amount of information otherwise withheld from them by their own authorities, thus making the effort worth our while. However, broadcasts of this sort will require careful study and selection of subjects and skillful presentation. For more detailed information see SGAA-30951 and SGAA-31001.

SECRET

SECRET

SGMA
Page 5

~~51401~~ 31401

19 FEB 1958

6. Re paragraph 8, ref.

Our status as guests of METAPHOR will soon cease. We have been asked by the METAPHOR case officer and have agreed to chip in beginning with 1 April 1958 in paying rent for the space on the 3rd floor where their office and recording studio are located. The monthly rent is 4,230 drachmae (\$141.00). Our share will be 1,000 drachmae (\$33.33). Another 1,000 drachmae will be contributed by OBTEST, another boarder. The present arrangement will have to be continued and the hardships and inconveniences disregarded, unpleasant and adverse as they are, as no other facilities are available under present conditions.

HMP/RSO;hos

[]

3 February 1958

Distribution:

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2 - SE

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